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Abstract
This work describes strategies for assessing and managing induced seismicity risk during each phase of a carbon 
storage project. We consider both nuisance and damage potential from induced earthquakes, as well as the indirect 
risk of enhancing fault leakage pathways.  A phased approach to seismicity management is proposed, in which 
operations are continuously adapted based on available information and an on-going estimate of risk.  At each 
project stage, specific recommendations are made for (a) monitoring and characterization, (b) modeling and 
analysis, and (c) site operations.  The resulting methodology can help lower seismic risk while ensuring site 
operations remain practical and cost-effective. 
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
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1. Introduction
Despite significant changes in the world energy mix in the last decade, carbon capture and storage (CCS) remains 
an important strategy for reducing atmospheric CO2 emissions. Like all technologies, however, carbon storage 
projects also create a number of environmental and safety hazards that must be addressed. In particular, historical 
experience with fluid injection operations has demonstrated that altering pore pressure conditions in the subsurface 
can trigger earthquakes—from microseismicity to large, damaging events [6, 7]. To date, experience with induced 
seismicity from CO2 injection is limited, but the hazard exists and should be considered. Work by Gan and Frohlich 
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[3], for example, suggests a likely connection between CO2-enhanced oil recovery operations in Texas and several 
M3+ events.  Microseismicity has been observed at a number of CCS sites, including the Weyburn-Midale Project 
[11], the Illinois Basin Decatur Project [1], and the In Salah Project [4].  While seismicity has not posed a significant 
problem for projects to date, as field experience grows some problematic sites are likely to be encountered.  It is 
therefore prudent for all projects to include potential seismicity in their risk evaluation and management plans.  
This work focuses on strategies for assessing and mitigating seismic risk during each phase of a carbon storage 
project. We follow the general notion that risk is described by three components [5]:
(1) one or more scenarios of concern, 
(2) the probability of a given scenario occurring, and 
(3) the probability of damage that would result.   
A quantitative measure of risk must include both the probability of an event and the severity of its impacts.  The 
term hazard is used to refer to components (1) and (2) alone—the probability of occurrence, without a measure of 
damage. While these terminology distinctions are pedantic, they have a practical impact for risk mitigation.  
Management strategies can be applied to the hazard component, the damage component, or both.  In the current 
context, strategies can be used to minimize the likelihood of problematic seismicity occurring.  Strategies can also 
be used to minimize damage even if larger earthquakes should occur. Given inherent challenges to ensuring that 
unwanted seismic events would never happen, it is pragmatic to choose sites and engineering safeguards such that 
consequences will be low even if unexpected behavior should appear. 
The first step in a risk assessment is identifying all plausible scenarios that may lead to damage. For a carbon 
storage project, four scenarios related to fault reactivation and induced seismicity should be considered. These 
scenarios are summarized in Table 1. Induced slip on faults could potentially lead to: (1) infrastructure damage; (2) 
a public nuisance; (3) brine-contaminated drinking water; and (4) CO2-contaminated drinking water. The table also 
provides quantitative metrics that can be used to transform the qualitative scenario descriptions into measurable 
hazard and risk quantities. The chosen metrics are examples, and other metrics may be preferred. Also note that 
hazard and risk are inherently space- and time-dependent quantities, and evolve over a project’s lifetime.  
The four scenarios lead to different types of damage—to property, to drinking water quality, or to public 
wellbeing. The last two scenarios result from the observation that slip in a fault zone can alter its permeability 
structure, potentially creating or reactivating leakage pathways [e.g. 12]. It is helpful, however, to make a distinction 
between brine and CO2 leakage. While they may occur together, they have different physical behavior, likelihoods 
of occurrence, and groundwater impacts. In the case that other in-situ fluids are present—e.g. oil or gas—additional 
scenarios can be added. Also, even though the process of fault reactivation, seismicity and leakage are generally 
closely related to each other, the occurrence of one does not imply the occurrence of the others. For example, there 
could be fault reactivation with aseismic slip, reactivated faults that remain impermeable, or intrinsically permeable 
faults that have not experienced any reactivation.  
Given these four scenarios, this paper focuses on strategies for assessing and altering their likelihoods of 
occurrence and the damage that may result. In particular, we describe a phased approach for seismic monitoring, risk 
assessment, and mitigation.  The basic goal is to constantly adapt the site operations to current conditions and 
available monitoring data.   As the risk analysis evolves, so too do monitoring and potential mitigation plans.   
Table 1. Four key scenarios of concern and typical hazard and risk metrics. 
Scenario of Concern Hazard Metrics Risk Metrics
Induced earthquakes lead to Annual probability of exceeding a given Annual probability of exceeding a given
… infrastructure damage … ground motion acceleration … structural damage level
… public nuisance … ground motion acceleration … nuisance level
… brine contaminated drinking water … volume of brinke leaked to aquifer … volume of contaminated water
… CO2 contaminated drinking water … volume of CO2 leaked to aquifer … volume of contaminated water
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While current scientific understanding of the physics underlying seismic processes is sophisticated, our ability to 
forecast seismic behavior is weak.  Similarly, while monitoring and characterization technologies are very useful for 
probing subsurface behavior, their spatial and temporal resolution is inherently limited.  A key goal in developing 
any project management plan is to incorporate the best scientific understanding and technology available.  An 
equally important goal, however, is to recognize the limitations that exist and how these shortfalls impact risk and 
decision-making. 
Fig. 1. Conceptual illustration of pressure interaction between a CO2 injector and a sealing fault (plan view). 
2. Key challenges 
Figure 1 provides a conceptual illustration of the basic seismicity concern. Here, a vertical well injects 
supercritical CO2 into a storage reservoir. The reservoir is intersected by a moderately large, pre-existing fault in 
close proximity to the injector. As injection begins, a CO2-rich plume grows away from the well, driven by pressure 
gradients and buoyancy forces. As the injected fluid displaces the in situ brine, an overpressured region also 
develops. Note that the extent of the pressure perturbation is typically much larger than the CO2-rich plume. This 
pressure plume can interact with the fault, and potentially trigger seismic or aseismic slip. 
To first order, a Coulomb friction criterion can be used to describe the condition for fault stability,
                 (1)
Here,  and  are the total shear and normal tractions applied on the fault, p is the pore fluid pressure, and 7 is the 
static friction coefficient. The geomechanical convention is that positive stresses are compressive. The quantity in 
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parentheses, ( - p), represents the effective normal traction on the fault, which is reduced by an increase in pore 
pressure. Due to the volumetric nature of fluid stress, the pore pressure has no impact on the shear component. The 
stability condition states that the fault will be in static equilibrium as long as the applied shear traction is less than 
the shear strength mobilized by the effective normal confinement.  We remark that equation (1) is a useful model in 
practice, but this approximation ignores many hydromechanical complexities that control actual fault stability.  
Also, it only applies when the fault is in a state of static equilibrium. Once slip is initiated, stored strain energy may 
be dissipated in a number of ways. The fault may creep aseismically until it reaches a new stable configuration 
(quasi-static slip), or rupture dynamically in an earthquake. 
The shear and normal tractions resolved on a fault plane will depend on the in situ state of stress in the formation, 
and on the orientation of the fault with respect to this stress field. For a given state of stress, some faults may be 
favorably oriented for slip, while others may be poorly oriented. A simple measure of fault stability is therefore the 
critical pore pressure change p required to make condition (1) an equality. It is commonly observed that many 
faults are naturally in a state of critical equilibrium, in which the equality condition is nearly satisfied under in situ 
stresses and formation fluid pressures [10]. Very small perturbations in stress or pore pressure can therefore trigger 
slip. It is these critically stressed faults that pose the greatest challenge for subsurface fluid injection [12].  
A primary factor controlling the maximum magnitude event that a fault can produce is its area. Figure 2 
illustrates a theoretical relationship between rupture diameter, stress drop, and moment magnitude [2, 9]. It assumes 
an idealized circular rupture geometry—reasonable for modest earthquakes—so that fault length (diameter) may be 
related to the maximum possible rupture area. Using the example fault from Figure 1 (diameter = 1 km) and a 
commonly observed range of stress drops (0.1 to 10 MPa) indicates a potential Mmax of 3.6 +/- 0.7. Such events 
could be felt by nearby populations and possibly damage seismically fragile infrastructure in the vicinity. If the fault 
intersected the caprock, the rupture area could also fully or partially penetrate the seal over several hundred meters.  
This could possibly open up new leakage pathways within the caprock, though this latter process is controlled by 
rock lithology and is not a certainty.  
Fig. 2. Theoretical scaling relationship relating fault rupture length, stress drop, and moment magnitude, assuming a circular rupture area. Shaded 
regions denote “typical” visibility of a fault using 3D seismic. Note that actual seismic resolution is highly specific to a given site and survey 
configuration, and should be carefully assessed for individual projects. 
Ea
rth
qu
ak
e 
M
ag
ni
tu
de
Fault Length, m
0.1
 MP
a1 M
Pa
10 
MP
a
-3
-2
-1
 0
 1
 2
 3
 4
 5
 6
 7
100 101 102 103 104 105
Invisible Challenging Likely
Visible
Visible
 Joshua A. White and William Foxall /  Energy Procedia  63 ( 2014 )  4841 – 4849 4845
While the example fault here is large enough to produce concerning events, it is also sufficiently small that it 
might be missed in a 3D seismic survey. Figure 2 also provides an indication of “typical” fault visibility, though 
actual seismic resolution is highly site and survey specific. The ranges here are provided simply to motivate 
discussion.  Fault visibility is primarily determined by whether the fault creates substantial vertical offsets on 
reflecting horizons. Small, low-offset, and steeply dipping faults are particularly difficult to see with reflection 
seismic. Basement faults and stratigraphic units having widely-spaced reflectors are also challenging. Strike-slip 
faults may have substantial accumulated displacement but little vertical offset.   
The issue of 3D seismic resolution is crucial for a carbon storage project to consider, as this practical limit 
divides pre-existing faults into two important populations: observed and unobserved. Observed faults are by 
definition larger and could potentially generate damaging events. At the same time, their visibility means that 
operators can plan for them during the site selection and project design phases. High-risk faults would simply be 
avoided, and low-risk faults would be carefully monitored. Unobserved faults are smaller and therefore less capable 
of generating larger events. The primary issue is the nuisance risk from small but felt events that occur relatively 
frequently. The invisibility of these smaller faults prior to injection poses a real challenge from a mitigation point of 
view. Certain site characteristics can be used as a guide to identify storage sites with lower seismicity potential, but 
some irreducible risk of re-activating smaller faults will always persist. The primary way to obtain information 
about such faults is to use local microseismic monitoring as injection proceeds. Given the inherent importance of 
identifying faults that may interact with the pressure plume, a careful assessment of seismic resolution and the 
structural geology at a given site is necessary to place a conservative upper bound on the size of the largest 
unobserved fault.
3. Event chain view of seismic impacts 
A storage project is a complex system, and a number of conditions must align in order for a particular impact to 
occur. Figure 3 provides a simple event-chain view of induced seismicity, describing a few key conditions that must 
be satisfied for one of the four risk scenarios described in Table 1 to occur. This perspective is useful because many 
of these conditions provide an opportunity for engineering safeguards to be put in place. By reducing the likelihood 
that any particular condition is satisfied—either through site selection, monitoring, or operational procedures—the 
overall risk can be reduced.
Some of these conditions are easier to address than others. As mentioned earlier, it is essentially impossible to 
guarantee in advance that the pressure plume will never encounter faults capable of generating significant 
seismicity. Careful site selection and characterization can be used to reduce the hazard, but it can never be 
eliminated. A pragmatic goal should therefore be to choose storage sites that can tolerate modest earthquakes 
without leading to significant consequences.  For example, consider a carbon storage site that is located relatively 
far from population centers, or in a region with stringent building code standards. In this case, the risk of nuisance or 
infrastructure damage is low, even if a worst-case event should occur.  Engagement with the local community and 
clear public communications can also help increase people’s tolerance for minor seismic events [6]. 
The event chain view also emphasizes that the connection between induced seismicity and groundwater 
contamination is indirect, with a number of other conditions needing to align for fluids to migrate out of the storage 
zone. Storage sites are typically chosen because they have resilient, widely spaced sealing layers.  These seals are 
also often ductile shales, which do not exhibit strong shear-enhanced permeability. By limiting the available leakage 
pathways and relying on multiple seals, the likelihood of brine or CO2 contamination of a shallow aquifer can be 
kept low. Most carbon storage projects to date have adopted this multi-layered approach to risk mitigation, in which 
overall risk is reduced by combining multiple mitigation techniques that reinforce one another.  In the worst case 
scenario, active leak intervention mitigation methods can also be deployed [8]. 
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Fig. 3. Event chain view of potential impacts from induced seismicity, describing a series of conditions that must be satisfied before a particular 
impact can occur.  Active and passive safeguards can be introduced to reduce the likelihood of a given condition being satisfied, therefore 
reducing overall risk. 
start
Will the pressure plume encounter a sufﬁciently large fault?
Is the fault capable of generating signiﬁcant seismicity, based on its
dimensions, orientation, tectonic loading, and frictional properties?
Signiﬁcant seismicity could occur.
Could resulting ground motion exceed building code standards?
Infrastructure could be damaged.
Could resulting ground motion exceed nuissance standards?
Local population could be scared and/or annoyed.
Does the fault fully or partially penetrate the caprock seal(s)?
Can new leakage pathways be created along the fault,
based on slip distance, slip area, and fault lithology?
Is the duration and magnitude of pressure drive sufﬁcient to allow
brine leakage to protected drinking water?
Brine contamination could occur.
Does mobile CO2 ever reach the fault?
Is the duration and magnitude of pressure and buoyancy drive
sufﬁcient to allow CO2 leakage to protected drinking water?
CO2 contamination could occur.
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4. Phased approach to risk management 
A carbon storage project can be broken into several stages of operation:  
1. Site-screening. This is the initial site assessment phase, when a number of alternative locations and injection 
horizons are considered. Typically the available characterization data are limited, unless a site is already being used 
for other purposes—e.g. oil and gas development, or previous injection operations.
2. Pre-injection. During this stage, baseline characterization is performed at the selected site. An underground 
injection control (UIC) permit is obtained, and one or more wells are drilled. Up to this point, available monitoring 
data are limited, covering a relatively short baseline period.  
3. Injection. This is the primary operation period, during which CO2 is injected and a suite of field monitoring 
data is collected at regular intervals.
4. Stabilization. This period covers the end of injection until the reservoir stabilizes—that is, pressure 
perturbations have returned to near baseline levels, and all mobile-phase CO2 is structurally trapped. Some level of 
post-injection site care (PISC) will persist until site liability is transferred or released.  
5. Mitigation and remediation. While this stage is hopefully unnecessary for the vast majority of CCS projects, 
active mitigation and/or remediation may be necessary if a significant seismicity problem is encountered. This stage 
therefore encompasses any significant deviation from planned operations to address unexpected problems. 
Induced events can occur at any time while overpressure persists. Once the pressure returns to baseline levels, the 
induced seismicity hazard disappears—though the background tectonic hazard will persist. The time window of 
concern for the first three risk scenarios listed in Table 1 (infrastructure damage, public nuisance, brine leakage) 
covers the entire overpressure period. The same is mostly true for the fourth scenario (CO2 leakage), as an induced 
event is required to create the CO2 leakage pathway (we assume pre-existing leakage pathways are handled in a 
separate assessment). Once a pathway exists, however, buoyancy can allow mobile CO2 leakage to continue even 
without overpressure. The damage component of scenario four can therefore extend beyond the overpressure period. 
Residual trapping, fault healing, geochemical mechanisms, or active mitigation may then be needed to limit impacts.  
Table 2 summarizes our phased approach to risk management, providing specific recommendations for tasks to 
be performed. The plan is divided into three components: (a) monitoring and characterization, (b) modeling and 
analysis, and (c) operations and management. The tasks under each category change from one phase to the next, 
with a general increase in complexity, sophistication, and cost over time. The last phase (mitigation and 
remediation) represents contingency plans in case unexpected seismicity should occur—that is, either unacceptable 
events happen or new data suggest a higher seismic risk than originally estimated.  
Pragmatically, the sophistication of the risk assessment will depend on the available monitoring and 
characterization data. Without data, there is little justification for spending time and money on a complicated 
analysis. In early stages of a project—particularly pre-injection—data limitations can make overly detailed 
assessments ill constrained and inaccurate. As a result, analyses must be continuously updated and improved as new 
information comes in.  
For the same reason, the monitoring and operation plans should evolve as well. It does not make sense to deploy 
an extensive (and expensive) microseismic array if seismicity ultimately turns out to be a minor project concern.  
The budget may be better spent on other monitoring and characterization efforts.  We therefore recommend projects 
initially deploy a limited baseline array, with sufficient sensitivity to detect microseismic events and determine 
approximate   locations.  If seismic risk turns out to be higher than expected once injection begins, a more extensive 
array can be deployed.  This adaptive approach ensures that project resources can be properly allocated to minimize 
risk, while not wasting time and budget on extraneous efforts.  
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Table 2. Summary description of a phased induced-seismicity risk management plan 
While it is important for a project to develop mitigation and remediation plans in advance and be ready to act 
upon them quickly, they may never be put into practice. Indeed, a significant number of CCS projects are operating 
today, and few of them have experienced any problematic seismicity whatsoever.  A quick response to unfolding 
events, however, is an important aspect of risk management. While not all events can be anticipated, speedy 
collection and interpretation of data, followed by immediate action, can lower the likelihood of severe or irreparable 
damage taking place. 
5. Conclusion 
Experience with induced seismicity at carbon storage sites is limited to date, and best practices will evolve as 
field experience grows.  Ongoing experience with other types of fluid injection, however, demonstrates that induced 
Monitoring & Characterization Modeling & Analysis Operations & Management
 – Collect regional stress estimates  – Back-of-the-envelope evaluations  – Screen-out high risk sites
 – Collect regional seismicity observations  – Identify red-flag site characteristics  – Choose best site to balance seismic risk
 – Collect regional fault characterizations  – Identify sensitive infrastructure          and other priorities
 – Perform baseline 3D seismic survey  – Estimate overpressure buildup and  – Alter operations strategy to address any
 – Identify faults and other structures           maximum plume extents           newly identified concerns
 – Assess seismic resolution and fault  – Perform reactivation analysis for observed  – Select appropriate traffic-light thresholds or
          visibility limits           faults           other triggers for action
 – Drill characterization well(s)  – Estimate likely Mmax from unknown faults  – Engage with local community on potential
 – Measure (estimate) in situ stress  – Develop baseline seismic hazard analysis           seismic impacts and mitigation plans
 – Deploy limited microseismic array
 – Monitor microseismicity  – Frequently update seismic hazard analysis  – Implement traffic-light or similar seismicity
 – Monitor above-zone pressure  – Analyze measured seismicity for statistical           reaction scheme
 – Monitor aquifer water-quality           changes, correlation with pressure  – Ensure timely collection, analysis, and
 – Perform regular falloff and other well tests           fluctuations, indications of previously           interpretation of monitoring data
          unobserved faults, and indications of  – Frequently re-evaluate quality and
          out-of-zone fluid migration           sensitivity of the monitoring plan
 – Quickly deploy additional surface geophones  – Implement full probabilistic risk analysis  – Reduce, halt, or backflow injection
          targeted at problem areas           for high-priority infrastructure, critical  – Update local community on situation and
 – Consider additional downhole geophone           water resources, etc           ongoing operations
          deployment  – Implement damage remediation and
– Performed controlled injection tests to probe           reimbursement plans, if necessary
          seismic behavior  – Evaluate major strategy changes, such as
          alternate injection locations or active
          pressure management
Si
te
-s
cr
ee
ni
ng
P
re
-i
nj
ec
tio
n
In
je
ct
io
n 
&
 P
IS
C
If
 p
ro
bl
em
at
ic
 s
ei
sm
ic
ity
 o
cc
ur
s
 Joshua A. White and William Foxall /  Energy Procedia  63 ( 2014 )  4841 – 4849 4849
seismicity is a serious concern and should be carefully addressed [7].  The phased approach suggested in this work 
can help operators balance the need to manage seismic risk with inescapable cost constraints and practical 
limitations of monitoring and characterization technology. Many successful CCS projects to date indicate that good 
site selection and careful project design can lead to acceptably low seismic risk, and with continued focus we 
believe this trend can continue into the future. 
Acknowledgements 
This work was completed as part of the National Risk Assessment Partnership. Support was provided by the U.S. 
Department of Energy, Office of Fossil Energy, Crosscutting Research Program. This paper contains work 
performed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory for the DOE under contract number DE-AC52-07NA27344 
and by Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory under contract number DE-AC02-05CH11231.
References
[1] Coueslan ML, Smith V, Jacques P, Will R, Maxwell S, Raymer D, Senel O, Finley R. Evolution of induced microseismicity at the Illinois 
Basis—Decatur Project.  American Geophysical Union, Fall Meeting 2013, Abstract #S23E-02. 
[2] Hanks TC. Earthquake stress drops, ambient tectonic stresses and stresses that drive plate motions. Pure & Appl. Geophys. 1977; 115(1-
2):441-458.
[3] Gan W, Frohlich C. Gas injection may have triggered earthquakes in the Cogdell oil field, Texas. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 2013; 110(47):18786-
18791.
[4] Goertz-Allmann BP, Kühn D, Oye V, Bohloli B, Aker E. Combining microseismic and geomechanical observations to interpret storage
integrity at the In Salah CCS site. Geophys. J. Int. 2014; doi: 10.1093/gji/ggu010. 
[5] Kaplan S, Garrick BJ. On the quantitative definition of risk. Risk Analysis 1981; 1(1):11-27. 
[6] Majer E, Nelson J, Robertson-Tait A, Savy J, and Wong I. Protocol for addressing induced seismicity associated with enhanced geothermal 
systems. US Department of Energy, DOE EE-0662, 2012. 
[7] National Research Council. Induced seismicity potential in energy technologies. National Academies Press, Washington DC, 2012.
[8] Réveillère A, Rohmer J, and Manceau J-C. Hydraulic barrier design and applicability for managing the risk of CO2 leakage from deep saline 
aquifers. Int. J. Greenh. Gas Control 2012; 9:62-71. 
[9] Scholz CH. The mechanics of earthquakes and faulting. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002. 
[10] Townend, J, and Zoback MD.  How faulting keeps the crust strong. Geology 2000; 28:399–402. 
[11] Verdon JP, Kendall J-M, White DJ, Angus DA. Linking microseismic event observations with geomechanical models to minimize the risks 
of storing CO2 in geological formations. Earth & Planet. Sci. Let. 2011; 305:143-152. 
[12] Zoback MD, Gorelick SM. Earthquake triggering and large-scale geologic storage of carbon dioxide. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 2012;
109(26):10164-10168.
